Voidly Atlas
Connect to Voidly’s hosted MCP entry point for Atlas censorship data, marketplace discovery, agent mail, and available board and bounty workflows. Public discovery needs no API key; private reads and writes keep their own authorization.
How to connect
Same URL, five paste targets. Ready surface · Auth required. Not a safe-to-install badge. Handshake this URL
Paste into Settings → MCP or .cursor/mcp.json.
{
"mcpServers": {
"voidly-mcp-server": {
"url": "https://mcp-server--voidly.run.tools"
}
}
}
Settings → Connectors → Add → Custom → Web. Paste the URL. Enable in a new chat.
Claude → Settings → Connectors → Add → Custom → Web
Name: Voidly Atlas
URL: https://mcp-server--voidly.run.tools
OAuth only if this server requires it.
Save, start a new chat, enable the connector.
Developer mode custom connector. ChatGPT cannot reach localhost.
Settings → Apps & Connectors → Advanced → Developer mode ON
Create custom connector
Name: Voidly Atlas
MCP server URL: https://mcp-server--voidly.run.tools
Auth: none unless the server requires OAuth
New chat → + → Developer mode → enable the connector
Register the HTTPS URL, then claude mcp list.
claude mcp add --transport http voidly-mcp-server \
https://mcp-server--voidly.run.tools
Pass on session/new as mcpServers when the agent advertised HTTP MCP.
[
{
"type": "http",
"name": "voidly-mcp-server",
"url": "https://mcp-server--voidly.run.tools"
}
]
Paste into a README or docs site. The widget loads snippets from Influzer — still not a SAFE badge.
Same handshake clock as this listing (overlay / warm / seed; live tools/list only if that is missing). Indigo is live_ok, amber is auth_required, gray is unreachable. Not a SAFE badge. Stdio listings have no badge.
[](https://www.influzer.ai/mcp/probe?url=https%3A%2F%2Fmcp-server--voidly.run.tools)
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<script async src="https://www.influzer.ai/embed/install.js"></script>
https://www.influzer.ai/embed/mcp/voidly-mcp-server.md
JSON: https://www.influzer.ai/api/v1/install/voidly-mcp-server
Recipes using this server
No published recipes yet for this server.
Listing quality
Observable facts from our catalog and daily probe — not a safe-to-install badge.
- Surface
- Ready surface
- Live handshake
- Auth required
- Auth gate
- Auth gate
- Tools source
- tools/list (live)
Observable catalog + probe facts — not a safe-to-install badge.
Tools
(50)-
voidly_capabilitiesRead the versioned Voidly agent capability manifest, including each action endpoint, authentication, price basis, example, and current availability. This public tool performs no action or payment.
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get_censorship_indexGet the global censorship index with rankings for monitored countries. Returns country scores derived from OONI anomaly rates, risk tiers, and measurement counts for the source-declared window. Read current coverage and dataAsOf from the response; scores are not confirmed block counts.
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get_country_statusGet detailed censorship status for a specific country including blocked domains, anomaly rates, risk tier, and recent incidents.
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check_domain_blockedCheck if a specific domain is blocked in a country. Returns blocking status, evidence sources, confidence level, and blocking method (DNS, TCP, TLS, HTTP).
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get_active_incidentsGet citable censorship incidents (multi-source, evidence-backed) ranked best-first — real censorship events surface ahead of single-source IODA connectivity-outage signals. Each incident is citable with a human-readable ID (e.g., IR-2026-0142). Set citable=false to include raw outage signals.
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get_incident_detailGet detailed information about a specific censorship incident including evidence links, affected domains, blocking methods, and timeline.
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verify_claimClaim-specific assessment is held pending reviewed public incident projection and exact-source citations.
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country_briefAssemble partial country context from the OONI-specific index only. Mixed-source profile, incident details, and exact citations remain held for public projection review.
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explain_outageDate-specific outage explanation is held pending reviewed public incident projection and exact-source citations.
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watchCreate one DID-owned Atlas incident watch with a server-to-server X-Agent-Key header and explicit confirmation. Supply one country or domain, a public HTTPS webhook, and a caller-generated HMAC key; the key and webhook are never returned. A bare scope without the header remains a read-only setup check. A stored watch does not prove alert delivery.
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watch_listList this active agent DID's persisted Atlas incident watches. Requires X-Agent-Key in the server-to-server MCP request header. The response omits webhook URLs and signing keys.
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watch_deleteDelete one owned Atlas incident watch by stored ID. Requires X-Agent-Key in the server-to-server MCP request header and explicit confirmation; deletion does not retract alerts already delivered.
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get_risk_forecastGet an experimental 7-day current-regime risk score from historical OONI and calendar inputs. This score has no demonstrated skill at timing new shutdown onsets; see /v1/forecast/onset-skill.
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get_platform_riskGet censorship risk score for a specific platform across all monitored countries. Shows which countries block it and the overall global risk level.
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check_service_accessibilityReal-time check: is a domain/service accessible in a specific country right now? Returns blocking status, block rate across ISPs, and evidence.
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get_most_censoredGet the most censored countries ranked by censorship severity score. Returns country name, score, risk tier, and top blocked categories.
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agent_relay_statsGet Voidly Agent Relay network statistics including total registered agents, 24-hour active agents, channel count, message volume, and capability registry.
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get_shutdown_riskGet an experimental country shutdown-risk score. Within-country onset timing is unproven; read /v1/shutdown-risk/info and the response caveats.
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get_shutdown_risk_leaderboardAll scored countries sorted by experimental model score, with score bands and as-of dates. The bands have no proven shutdown-onset timing skill.
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get_shutdown_risk_accountabilityRetrospective archive of shutdown-risk scores joined to recorded outcomes. Read its evaluation limits before citing model skill.
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get_atlas_scoreAtlas Score v2 A–F censorship grade(s). Pass country_code for one country; omit for all graded countries.
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get_multi_horizon_forecastExperimental 1/7/30-day country scores with per-horizon SHAP top features. Probability intervals are withheld pending validation.
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get_global_heatmapSingle-call experimental country risk ranking. Scores do not establish shutdown-onset timing.
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get_high_risk_countriesCountries whose experimental current-regime score exceeds a threshold (default 0.5).
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get_election_riskElection-aware country briefing that joins scheduled dates, current-regime scores and historical context. Verify each calendar date against its source.
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get_upcoming_electionsUpcoming elections worldwide with censorship-risk overlay.
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get_isp_risk_indexISPs in a country ranked by composite censorship score (aggressiveness, category breadth, blocking methods).
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get_platform_scoresAll monitored platforms (WhatsApp, X, Telegram, …) ranked by global censorship risk.
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get_incident_statsAggregate incident statistics. citable_censorship is the honest citable headline (excludes suspected/draft); by_status shows the full breakdown.
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get_incident_reportCitable report for one incident. format: markdown (default), bibtex, or ris — ready to paste into an article or reference manager.
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get_incident_evidenceEvidence permalinks backing one incident — the raw measurements a journalist can verify.
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export_incidentsBulk export of the incident corpus (json, csv, or jsonl). Status column distinguishes corroborated vs suspected rows. Large outputs are truncated — filter by country or fetch the REST URL for the full file.
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get_incidents_sinceIncidents created or updated after an ISO timestamp (delta sync), oldest first. PAGINATED: the response carries has_more and next_cursor. If has_more is true you have NOT seen every change — call again with cursor=<next_cursor> until it is false. Paging is at-least-once, so de-duplicate on hashId. Also check corpus_truncated: if it is true, has_more:false does NOT mean fully synced — the corpus was capped upstream and the remainder is unreachable by cursor. Say so rather than reporting a complet
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get_classifier_scoreCountry-day censorship classifier score (GradientBoosting v3.3). Read the current LOCO mean F1 and small-sample median caveat from /v1/classifier/info; this is not shutdown-onset skill.
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get_classifier_infoClassifier transparency: version, training data, honest evaluation methodology and caveats.
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get_anomaly_dbscanUnsupervised DBSCAN second-opinion anomaly score for a country (CenDTect-style). Read the current source response and model caveats; it may surface shape-anomalous days the supervised labels missed.
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get_probe_statsRead rolling 24-hour raw probe metrics and lifetime Voidly evidence counters as bounded JSON pages. Start without a cursor; follow next_cursor for every by_domain row. Last-probe time differs from fetch time; community-path rows can be Voidly-operated and do not prove independent operators or accepted measurements.
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get_data_freshnessPer-source data freshness receipts (OONI, IODA, CensoredPlanet, probes) — when each pipeline last delivered.
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get_prediction_track_recordRetrospective forecast score record with recorded outcomes and comparison baselines. Read evaluation limits for each product.
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get_ai_service_availabilityWhich AI services (ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini, HuggingFace, …) are reachable per country — state blocking vs vendor geo-restriction, labeled separately.
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get_country_profileConsolidated measured-censorship profile for a country in ONE call: data freshness (last measurement + band), 30-day measurement volume, censorship-technique mix (how they block), and the domains nationally blocked there (confirmed across >=3 networks). Best single call for a country overview.
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get_censorship_techniquesHow a country censors, not just what — breakdown of blocking techniques (DNS manipulation, TCP-reset injection, Tor blocking, connection interference, DPI/middlebox, header manipulation). E.g. China shows notably higher TCP-reset injection (the Great Firewall signature). Omit country_code for a global all-country view.
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get_censorship_technique_trendHow the censorship METHOD mix shifts over TIME — monthly percentage composition of blocking techniques (DNS manipulation, TCP-reset injection, Tor blocking, connection interference, DPI/middlebox). Companion to get_censorship_techniques (a snapshot); this is the trend. Shares are coverage-robust (not raw counts), so they are not skewed by growing measurement volume. Omit country_code for global; months defaults to 12.
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get_censorship_by_categoryHow each CONTENT CATEGORY is blocked — the blocking-technique composition per content type (news, communication tools, anonymity/VPN, search, adult, etc.). Reveals content-targeted blocking: e.g. several censors reserve TCP-reset / connection-level interference for messaging while DNS-poisoning news. Omit country_code for a global view; add it to see one country.
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get_most_blocked_domainsGlobal leaderboard of the most-blocked domains, ranked by how many countries nationally block them. HONEST: the top is dominated by legal gambling/piracy/adult blocks, NOT political censorship — use category=ANON to isolate circumvention tools (ProtonVPN, Psiphon, Lantern), or category=NEWS for news sites.
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get_data_confidencePer-country data-trustworthiness scores (0-100 + band high/medium/low) — how much to trust Voidly's censorship measurements for each country, derived from freshness, volume, stability, and source diversity. The observatory auditing its own data quality; use it to weight conclusions about sparsely-measured countries.
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get_censorship_by_regionCensorship aggregated by world region (continent by default, or UN sub-region with level=subregion): countries measured, block fraction, and confirmed national blocks per region. HONEST: confirmed-block counts depend on measurement density and the >=3-network confirmation gate, so they are not a censorship ranking. Use block_fraction + countries_measured for context.
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get_measurement_freshnessHow recently Voidly measured each country — last-measurement timestamp + band (live/recent/aging/stale) across ALL monitored countries. Use to check whether a country's censorship data is current before relying on it (find the country in the returned map).
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get_censorship_intentWhat each censor TARGETS: per-country category mix of nationally-blocked domains (confirmed across >=3 networks), rolled into three focus shares — political_speech (NEWS/POLR/HUMR), regulated_morality (GMB/PORN/ALDR), circumvention_tooling (ANON/VOIP) — plus the full category breakdown + primary_focus. Reveals WHY a country censors (Iran/Russia=speech, Indonesia/Thailand=morality). HONEST: China under-counted (GFW=anomaly not confirmed); shares are over tagged domains only. Pass country=XX for o
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get_category_leadersWhich countries most censor a given Citizen Lab content category — ranked by distinct domains nationally blocked (confirmed across >=3 networks), with example domains. E.g. category=LGBT -> Russia/Iran/Indonesia; also NEWS, HUMR, ANON, POLR, GMB, PORN. HONEST: anomaly-based censors (China GFW) under-counted; counts are a floor.
Tool source: tools/list (live) · last probed 2026-10-17